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If we care for the poor and we care for the environment, what are we to
do? Is the proper path to follow to turn to the state, passing laws that
mandate that others share in our concerns? Several of the speakers at the
"Peace with Creation" symposium at the University of St. Thomas School
of Law (where the talk on which this article is based was first delivered)
must believe so, as I have heard calls for international treaties to address
climate change, publicly provided medical care, subsidies for small scale
agriculture, and a host of other government programs to redress the
problems of the poor and the environment. 1 My fellow participants who call
for state action, and many in the wider debate as well, do so with the best of
motives and using powerful language from the rich heritage of Christian
social thought generally and from Catholic social teaching specifically.
Their calls for expanding the scope of the state are mistaken, however, for
they fail to consider the truths about human behavior that economists have
discovered. I do not propose to substitute The Wealth of Nations for the
Gospels; rather I propose to understand our Gospel-derived obligations in
light of the insights of Adam Smith. If we fail to do so, we risk substituting
symbolism for effective action and feeling good for doing good. If our
obligation toward God's creation is to be good stewards and our obligation
toward the poor is to do charity, then our good intentions will not suffice
when called to account for our ineffectual or counter-productive actions
when more effective courses of action were open to us.
Thomas Woods, Jr., an author whose work I greatly admire, opens his
remarkable book The Church and the Market: A Catholic Defense of the
Free Economy with a chapter entitled "In Defense of Economics."2 It is
unfortunate that virtually every claim of relevance for economics within a
discourse among Christians is compelled to begin with such a defense.
Instead of a defense, I am going to begin with the assertion that economics
is not only relevant to our discussion of the preferential option for the poor
and the environment, but it also is essential to that discussion. In short, I
will make the somewhat radical claim that unless we understand economics
1. See John Hart, The Poor of the Planet and the Planet of the Poor: Ecological Ethics and
Economic Liberation,S U. ST. THOMAS LJ. 144 (2008); Lucia A. Silecchia, The "Preferential
Option for the Poor": An Opportunity and a Challenge for Environmental Decision Making,S U.
ST. THOMAS LJ. 87 (2008).

2.

THOMAS E. WOODS, JR., THE CHURCH AND THE MARKET:

FREE ECONOMY

13-39 (2005).

A CATHOLIC

DEFENSE OF THE
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and apply economic reasoning to environmental problems, not only will we
fail to solve those environmental problems, but we will also fail to satisfy
our Christian obligation to provide a preferential option for the poor.
I do not think this actually is a radical claim, but it sounds radical
because the environmental policy debate usually proceeds on terms that cast
markets as environmental villains. The tenor of the debate has changed a
little as of late, in part due to the impact of economists like Wheaton
College economist P.J. Hill, my colleague at the Property and Environment
Research Center (PERC) and a particularly thoughtful thinker about the
intersection of Christianity, economics, and the environment. 3 This change
is also due to the work of Rev. Robert Sirico and his colleagues at the
Acton Institute. 4 It has not changed enough, however, to make the
environmental policy debate sufficiently realistic such that environmental
law has a chance of positively affecting the lives of the poor and improving
our stewardship of God's creation, as our discussion at the symposium
suggested. Beginning with some basic economic truths, which I will then
apply to environmental problems and to the problems of the poor, I will
conclude by defending my claim that economics is necessary, but not
sufficient, to addressing environmental policy while also giving due
attention to the needs of the poor.
SOME ECONOMIC TRUTHS

Economics offers many insights into how the world around us works,
much more than would be possible to summarize even in a full-length law
review article with many footnotes. s From among those many insights, I
have selected three "propositions" that demonstrate the fundamental points
that economics is necessary, but not sufficient, to address environmental
issues and that economics is necessary, but not sufficient, to reconcile the
obligations of faith toward the poor and the need to protect the
environment.
By "propositions" I mean fundamental truths about human behavior
and the natural world that we ignore at our peril, truths as basic as the laws
of gravity or humanity's susceptibility to sin. We can write statutes or regulations that ignore these-and Congress, legislatures, and regulators the
world over frequently do-but such measures risk the same fatal results as
bridges built without accounting for gravity. These propositions I will offer
are economic "theory," but they are theory in the sense that the laws of
3. See, e.g., Peter J. Hill, Environmental Theology: A Judea-Christian Defense, 3 MARKETS
& MORALITY 158 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Rev. Robert A. Sirico, Our Stewardship Mandate, RELIGION & LIBERTY,
Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 15.
5. Even St. John the Theologian noted in his Gospel that "[a]nd there are also many other
things which Jesus did, which if they were written in detail, I suppose that even the world itself
would not contain the books that would be written." John 21:25.
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gravity are a theory and are founded upon economic insights spanning hundreds of years of careful analyses, testing of hypotheses, and rigorous debates. That does not mean all economists agree on all policy implications or
that every prediction by an economist comes true. It does mean that the core
principles of the discipline are not mere matters of opinion and that economics is not a "point of view" to be accorded equal weight with folk tales
or political preferences. All theories of how the world works are not equal
-some work better than others and the ones that work deserve greater
weight in policy debates than the ones that do not. Economics' great
strength is that it is a concise and powerful theory that explains the world
remarkably well. Those who ignore its insights are doomed to fail.
Proposition 1: TANSTAAFL

Science fiction author Robert Heinlein coined the phrase "TANSTAAFL" as a shorthand way of saying "There Ain't No Such Thing As A
Free Lunch" in his classic 1966 science fiction novel The Moon is a Harsh
Mistress, in which he described a revolution by residents of lunar colonies
against oppressive governments on Earth in 2076. 6 Heinlein had the revolutionaries emblazon TANSTAAFL on their flag and wove the principle
through the free lunar society he imagined-a place where even air cost
people money.
"No free lunch" means that everything costs something. Everything.
No exceptions. At a minimum, if I spend my time doing one activity, I
cannot spend that time doing something else. Economists refer to the idea
that resources devoted to one activity are unavailable for other activities as
"opportunity cost." If we do X, we cannot use those resources to do Y. The
failure to recognize that there is an opportunity cost to committing resources to any given use can have disastrous consequences because when
we do not recognize that our actions have costs we cannot intelligently consider our alternatives. And if we cannot assess the costs and benefits of our
alternatives, we cannot make reasoned choices among them. 7 In short,
tradeoffs matter, and we need to pay attention to them.
We live in a post-Fall, resource constrained society. In the language of
Economics 101, we face a choice between guns and butter. If we buy more
guns, we have fewer resources left for butter. The same principle applies
whether we are considering individual choices or social choices about the
6. ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON Is A HARSH MISTRESS 162 (Orb Books 1997) (1966).
For an examination of the underlying legal implications of the novel, see Dmitry N. Feofanov,
Luna Law: The Libertarian Vision in Heinlein's The Moon is a Harsh Mistress, 63 TENN. L. REv.
71 (1995).

7. Bjorn Lomborg makes this argument in his book on global warming: "Far from being
amoral to compare costs and benefits, it is crucially moral to ask, How do we help the most? Can
it really be moral to do anything less?" BJORN LOMBORG, COOL IT: THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST'S GUIDE TO GLOBAL WARMING 135 (2007).
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allocation of tax dollars. Because we live in a world of scarce resources, we
must choose between competing uses of our resources. Just as individuals
do, so too must regulators make such choices.
There are many environmental examples of TANSTAAFL in action; I
will briefly mention one concerning private choices and one concerning
public choices. The private choice example involves the Nature Conservancy, an environmental group which engages in efforts to protect the environment by acquiring environmentally sensitive land. 8 The group contracts
for oil and gas production and logging on some properties, generating income that can be used for additional preservation efforts elsewhere. 9 These
transactions occur because the group recognizes the opportunity cost of not
developing the land-in short, TANSTAAFL. The Nature Conservancy
must either engage in some economic use of its land that can generate such·
revenues or forego the opportunity for revenues that would enable it to further its mission. In some cases, limited development provides the organization with the resources to have a greater impact by allowing it to acquire
more land elsewhere.
The public choice example is the aftermath of the Supreme Court's
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Io The state agency
issued regulations that prohibited property owner David Lucas from building on two beach front properties he owned. Lucas sued, arguing that the
regulations had taken his property under the Takings Clause because they
effectively foreclosed all development. The Supreme Court agreed, and the
Commission was forced to purchase the property from Lucas. Because of
opportunity costs, paying for the property meant that the Commission had
fewer resources available for its other activities. Ironically, once it bore the
opportunity cost, the Commission determined that the additional environmental benefit of preventing construction on Lucas' property was not worth
the cost and sold the land to a builder, who constructed homes on the propertyY Faced with the opportunity cost of its behavior, the agency was
forced to make decisions about its priorities.
8. The Nature Conservancy is controversial because of issues surrounding both its spending
and its fundraising. See Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Image is a Sensitive Issue, WASH.
POST, May 4, 2003, at A23, for a discussion of an internal memo from the group in response to the
Washington Post series that showed that the organization was "worried that the charity would be
portrayed as if it had 'systematically colluded with wealthy individuals and corporations to conduct land transactions that manipulate the tax code to the benefit of the affluent' and that it would
appear to be an 'environmental Enron.' "
9. Monte Burke, Bco-Pragmatists, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2001), available at http://www.forbes.
comllforbes/2001/0903/063.html.
10. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
11. For the development history of the plot as graphically illustrated by economics professor
William Fischel in his web essays, see William Fischel, A Photographic Update on Lucas v South
Carolina Coastal Council: A Photographic Essay, available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/-wfischel/lucasupdate.html; and William Fischel, Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council: A Photographic Essay, available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/-wfischelllucasessay.html; see also DAVID
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Proposition 2: Incentives matter

In general, when something is more expensive, people buy less of it
and when it is less expensive, they buy more of it. 12 Thus incentives matter:
when costs go up or down, people make different choices. In other words,
demand curves slope down, and supply curves slope up. I wish that stating a
simple truth like this as a "proposition" was seen as silly because of the
now-universal acceptance of its self-evidence, but environmental laws in
particular seem to have been written not only in ignorance of the truth and
importance of supply and demand, as if economic incentives did not matter
at all.
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is perhaps the best known example of a law that ignores the importance of incentives. 13 The case of the redcockaded woodpecker is an excellent example of why taking incentive effects of regulatory efforts into account is critical to accomplishing statutory
goals. 14 Economists Dean Lueck and Jeffrey Michael examined private timber land owners' management decisions in an area of North Carolina where
the woodpeckers lived. 15 Their results exemplify the impact of incentives.
When red-cockaded woodpecker nests were found on private land, ESA
regulations required a series of steps to protect the nests which cost the
LUCAS, LUCAS VS. THE GREEN MACHINE (1995) (Lucas' own account); Dana Beach & Kim Diana
Connolly, A Retrospective on Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Public Policy Implicationsfor the 21st CentUlY, 12 SE. ENVTL. LJ. 1, 14 (2003) (describing post-decision purchase and
sale). Cf, Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote More
Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORlES 221 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds.,
2004) (a more skeptical account of the Lucas property's history).
12. In two special cases, an increase in price induces an increase in demand. The first concerns a class of lUXUry goods, sometimes termed "Veblen goods" after economist Thorstein Veblen. Higher prices make these goods more desirable, because possessing them signals the owner's
wealth and status. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 85 (1899); Laurie
Simon Bagwell & B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 86 AM. EeoN. REv. 349, 350 (1996). The other class of such goods is "Giffen goods," in
which the interaction of substitution and income effects produces an increase in demand. The only
empirical evidence of the existence of such goods is in the context of poor consumers attempting
to maintain subsistence consumption levels when prices rise. See Robert T. Jensen & Nolan H.
Miller, Giffen Behavior: Theory and Evidence (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 13243, 2007). The classic example of this is low quality foods. When the price of poor quality
bread increases, low income buyers must spend more of their income maintaining their consumption level of the poor quality bread. Id. As a result, they have less money left over to buy better
quality bread, and so increase their consumption of the low quality bread to replace the better
quality bread they can no longer afford. See Michael V. White, Invention in the Face of Necessity:
Marshallian Rhetoric and the Giffen Good(s), ECON. REc., Mar. 1990, at 1. Neither is relevant to
the discussion of environmental goods and services.
13. See Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The 'Living Constitution,' the Third Amendment and the Endangered Species Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 769 (2000).
14. One reason it is repeatedly discussed is that there is a shocking lack of social science
research into the incentive effects of the ESA. See Jonathan H. Adler, Money or Nothing: The
Adverse Environmental Consequences of Uncompensated Land-Use Controls, 49 B.C. L. REv.
301 (forthcoming 2008).
15. Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction under the Endangered Species Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27 (2003).
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landowners considerable timber revenue-a single colony could cost a
landowner up to $200,000 in potential revenue. 16 Because red-cockaded
woodpeckers prefer to build nests in older pine trees, harvesting timber
before the trees reach the age at which the birds nest in them greatly reduces
the chances of a nest being built. And, of course, harvesting timber of any
age before a colony's presence is documented, and the regulations applied,
eliminates the potential losses from regulatory enforcement. What Lueck
and Michael found was that proximity to an existing red-cockaded woodpecker colony led to a higher probability of both timber harvesting in general and of the harvesting of younger trees in particular. In short, because
the ESA-regulations made the presence of red-cockaded woodpeckers
costly to them, landowners took steps to reduce the likelihood that the
woodpeckers would establish a presence on their land. Note that all the
steps the landowners took to prevent woodpecker colonization were entirely
legal, but the ESA incentives had created an incentive to "shoot, shovel, and
shut Up."17
This result is remarkable only in the context of discussions of whether
environmental laws create bad incentives. Environmental pressure groups
routinely make incentive-based arguments when arguing for the need for
additional laws. For example, they often argue that without penalties and
permit regulations, firms will dispose of wastes through smokestacks and
pipelines, polluting the air and water. Only when the same logic is applied
to the impact of environmental statutes, particularly ones as symbolically
important as the Endangered Species Act, is the application of economic
logic labeled as illegitimate. But to deny that incentives matter is as foolish
and counterproductive as to deny that gravity causes objects to fall when
. .
they are dropped.
Proposition 3: The margin matters

Regrettably, political discourse often casts decisions in terms of absolutes, with all the nuance and insight of a bumper-sticker: "Extinction is
forever;" "save the whales;" or "protect our natural resources." But most
choices are not made between absolutes or extremes; most are made at the
margins. We are only rarely confronted with either/or choices. Most of the
time we must decide between allocating a little more of our (or someone
else's) time, money, or other resources to this activity or that. Should we
increase the habitat for the red-cockaded woodpecker by adding this parcel
to the protected area or not? Should we reduce ambient air levels of ozone
from 0.09 parts per million (ppm) to 0.08 ppm? And at the margin, incentives are particularly important.
16. Id. at 33.
17. Robert H. Nelson, Shoot, Shovel, and Shut Up,

FORBES,

Dec. 4, 1995, at 82.
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The discovery that margins matter was no small thing. Historians of
economic thought term the beginning of systematic consideration of marginal analysis in the late nineteenth century the "marginal revolution."18
Nonetheless, the key to marginal analysis is straightforward: when the next
increment of an activity yields benefits in excess of its costs, there is an
incentive to engage in more of the activity. The second proposition instructs
us that when the last increment costs more than its benefits, there is an
incentive to engage in less of the activity. As a result, individuals adjust
their consumption and production of goods and services in response to the
marginal costs and benefits of those goods and services. When deciding
whether to buy more of good A or good B, if the net marginal benefit of
another unit of good A exceeds the net marginal benefit of another unit of
B, people will buy the additional unit of A instead of the additional unit of
B. Decisions in the environmental context are regularly made on the margin
in setting ambient environmental quality standards, emissions levels, activity levels, and so forth.
What happens when we make decisions without considering margins?
There are multiple errors introduced by not thinking about margins, but one
illustrative example will make the point. Not considering marginal costs
and benefits means that we do not get the maximum environmental quality
possible for a given expenditure leveL In the 1970s and early 1980s, the
EPA repeatedly considered whether to adopt a "bubble" policy for air emissions from multiple points within a single facility.19 In essence, the policy
question was whether the words "stationary source" in various sections of
the Clean Air Act meant a single smokestack or could be interpreted to
lump together all the smokestacks in an entire facility. Economists argued
that allowing the facility to be treated as a single unit would result in more
cost-effective pollution control because the marginal cost of emissions reductions would differ across smokestacks. If the entire group of stacks in a
facility were treated as a single stationary source, the plant owner would
reduce emissions where it was cheapest to do so, yielding the same total
emissions reduction at a lower cost. Treating each smokestack as a separate
stationary source, on the other hand, would result in higher costs but no
greater emissions reductions. Failing to consider margins increased the cost
of environmental protection. (The legal debate over these issues-which
produced the landmark Chevron decision-properly did not address the economics, as Congress had neglected to do so in writing the statute.)
18. See THE MARGINAL REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS: INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATION
(R.D. Collison Black et aI. eds., 1973).
19. After two D.C. Circuit decisions by different panels, one rejecting the bubble concept in
Clean Air Act new source context, ASARCO Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and the
other approving it in the Clean Air Act's "prevention of significant deterioration" context, Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the Supreme Court approved it in the
context of EPA consideration of state implementation plans. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Perhaps much of this seems obvious. I hope so. Fundamental economic principles are obvious because they describe what we all know from
our day-to-day lives to be true. More importantly, since we are here to discuss a Christian perspective on the environment and the poor, none of them
are incompatible with either a general Christian or a specifically Catholic
view of human nature. The compatibility of the essentials of economics
with Christian teachings is something that is hotly debated, and I certainly
don't want to assert that every Christian or even every Catholic theologian
is at heart a fan of markets. But market economics have a distinguished
history in Christian and Catholic thought. For example, the Spanish Scholastics (the School of Salamanca) built on the writings of Saint Thomas
Aquinas to develop extended treatments of many economic issues and had
considerable influence on thinkers like Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and the
Physiocrats and, via those thinkers, an impact on Scottish Enlightenment
figures including Adam Smith.20 And ever since Pope Leo XIII's encyclical
Rerum Novarum in 1891, Catholic social teaching on economics has consistently affirmed the legitimacy of the market, albeit with more qualifications and with somewhat less enthusiasm than Catholic and other free
marketers might prefer?l
From my own amateur and relatively untutored position as a lay Orthodox Christian, I find a comforting convergence between the dictates of
faith and the dictates of economics. TANSTAAFL simply points out that
choice among alternatives is a fundamental fact of existence, and I find in
Christian teaching a guide to making choices. Both the Old and New Testaments are filled with examples of incentives making a difference,22 and
marginalism is fully compatible with the nature of choices we face. Indeed,
as humans touched by original sin, we had best hope that God does not
demand absolutes and that He will view choices for good on the margin as
counting in our favor on Judgment Day.
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

When we apply economic principles to the environment, we discover
that economics offers considerable guidance in how to best protect the envi20. ALEJANDRO A. CHAFUEN, FAITH AND LIBERTY: THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF THE LATE
SCHOLASTICS 14-16 (2003).
21. See WOODS, supra note 2, at 1-3 (discussing Papal critiques of the market while noting
essential affirmation of the essentials of market economics).
22. God's covenant with Israel in Exodus 19 is built around incentives. If the people ofIsrael
agreed to "obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant," God offered them status as "a peculiar
treasure to me above all people." Exodus 19:5. In the New Testament, Christ's parable of the
Wicked Vinedressers is a classic case of mistaken beliefs about incentives. Matthew 21:33-46.
The people who kill the servants and heir of the vineyard owner incorrectly believe that they can
take the heir's inheritance by their actions. Instead, of course, the owner of the vineyard will "put
those wretches to a miserable death" and give the vineyard to other tenants. Id. Had the tenants
correctly perceived their incentives, as the parable is designed to teach us to do, they would have
yielded up the fruits of the harvest to the landlord and received a much greater reward.
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ronment, as well as sheds light on why environmental problems occur and
why some regulatory efforts have failed to produce the promised results.
Three core insights from economics for environmental policy capture the
contributions that economic analysis can make to environmental policy
debates.
Proposition 4: Private property rights create incentives for responsible
stewardship of resources.

Garrett Hardin's 1968 article The Tragedy of the Commons has had a
tremendous influence on environmentallaw.z3 My Westlaw search of the
Journals and Law Reviews database turned up almost 1200 citations, an
impressive total considering that much of Hardin's influence occurred
before law review articles were included in the electronic library. Less often
discussed is the fact that Hardin got his facts wrong with respect to the
medieval English village commons from which he drew the central metaphor. 24 (Even less frequently mentioned is that Hardin's article was primarily an argument for authoritarian measures to limit population growth.?5
Nonetheless, The Tragedy of the Commons has become the paradigm
through which a multitude of environmental problems are viewed.
One of Hardin's most important conclusions was that "private property
or something formally like it" was a solution to commons' problems.26
Property rights solve the tragedy of the commons because they provide
property owners with the incentives to treat their land responsibly. Hardin's
metaphor began with villagers deciding how many cattle to put on the common pasture. Each villager received all the benefit of each cow he added,
since the cattle were privately owned. But since the pasture was held in
common, each villager bore only a portion of the costs of the cattle, since
the cattle ate grass belonging to all. Once the carrying capacity of the common pasture was reached, the net benefit to the village of adding an additional cow to the pasture was negative due to the impact of overgrazing on
the existing cattle, while the net private benefit remained positive. When the
commons was privatized, however, the owner of the pasture would not ex23. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCI., Dec. 1968, at 1243.
24. Historically, villagers were limited by "stinting" rights, which governed the number of
cattle each landowner could add to the pasture. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 224 n.3 (1990).
25. Hardin, supra note 23, at 1248 ("Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all .... The only
way we can preserve and nurture other and more precious freedoms is by relinquishing the freedom to breed, and that very soon.").
26. [d. at 1245. As Prof. Adler notes,
Hardin's reluctance to call for broader property rights in other environmental resources,
such as air and water, stemmed from his belief that such resources 'cannot be readily
fenced,' not out of any concern that the power of property rights to promote sound
resource use was limited to farmlands and pastures.
Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of Property Rights
& Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LmERTY 987, 1021 n.269 (2005).
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ceed the carrying capacity of the pasture since the private and social benefits were now identical. Private property thus prevents the tragedy of the
commons.
We observe such solutions with respect to many common resources.
The use of individual tradable quotas in fisheries,27 customary allocation of
lobstering rights by Maine "lobster gangs,"28 and customary range rights
enforced by cattlemen's associations on open ranges 29 are just a few of the
examples. In general, property rights solve the commons problem because
they give the owner the incentive to maximize the total stream of benefits
from his property, including its future value. Since poor management of a
resource reduces the net present value of the stream of future benefits from
a resource, even an owner who is ignorant of appropriate resource management has an incentive to learn to do better, to hire someone who knows
better methods, or to sell to someone who knows better management techniques because doing so increases the value of the resource to the owner
himself.
Moreover, private property rights allow the fullest exploitation of local
knowledge. Economist Friedrich Hayek's seminal 1945 article, The Use of
Knowledge in Society,30 pointed out the critical importance of the knowledge each individual has. When resource management decisions are made
by people other than the resource owner, there is an inevitable loss of such
knowledge. Hayek argued that local knowledge was sufficiently important
that it precluded centralized economic planning;31 his critique is equally
relevant to centralized environmental planning. In 1945, Hayek noted that
much of economic analysis assumed "all the relevant information," a
known system of preferences, and "complete knowledge."32 As a result, the
problem of allocation of resources became "purely one of logic" because
"the answer to the question of what is the best use of the available means is
implicit in our assumptions."33 This characterization of the "economic
problem" missed the point, Hayek argued, because "[t]he peculiar character
of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the
27. See Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries, 8
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9, 18-22,40-41 (2002); Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation through
Collusion: Antitrust as an Obstacle to Marine Resource Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
3, 17-20 (2004) (discussing success of individual tradable quotas programs).
28. See JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988) (describing informal
property rights system used to allocate lobster fishing areas and prevent overharvesting).
29. See Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes & Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider
Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 581 (1998); TERRY L.
ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NOT So WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRON.
TIER 148-58 (2004).
30. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
31. [d. at 524 ("[C]entral planning based on statistical information by its nature cannot take
direct account of these circumstances of time and place ....").
32. [d. at 519.
33. [d.
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fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use
never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed
bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the
separate individuals possess."34
Local knowledge is relevant to a wide variety of environmental
problems. Polluters have considerable local knowledge about their production processes and other details of their facilities that provide them with
important advantages in finding ways to reduce emissions. Landowners
have local knowledge about their land that allows better stewardship. Fishermen familiar with a particular stream often know river conditions better
than distant planners. This does not mean that outsiders have nothing to
contribute to environmental debates-governments often have the resources
to produce and distribute scientific knowledge that improves decision making, for example. What it means, however, is that better results often come
from leaving resources in private hands and offering incentives for improved environmental results, rather than attempting to dictate the method
of achieving environmental goals.
Private property rights are certainly compatible with Christian doctrine, and the Spanish Scholastics offered justifications for private property
that are remarkably similar to the economic analysis of the commons problem. For example, Tomas de Mercado argued that:
We cannot find a person who does not favor his own interests or
who does not prefer to furnish his own home rather than that of
the republic. We can see that privately owned property flourishes,
while city- and council-owned property suffers from inadequate
care and worse management. In this regard, Aristotle states that
the pleasure that a man feels while working at his own business is
inevitable. It is not easy to explain how important it is for man to
know that he is the owner of the thing he produces. On the other
hand, people treat common enterprises with great indifference.... After man's loss of innocence, it becomes necessary for
each individual to share in the things of this world, in real estate
or movable riches .... If universal love will not induce people to
take care of things, private interest will. Hence, privately owned
goods will multiply. Had they remained in common possession,
the opposite would be true. 35
The conclusion seems inescapable that if we are to solve commons
problems, we must resort either to "private property or something formally
like it" or to the type of authoritarian solutions that Hardin suggested in his
article were necessary to prevent over-population. Between those alternatives, the choice seems remarkably easy.
34. Id.
35. TOMAS DE MERCADO, SUMMA DE TRATOS y CONTRATOS bk. 2, chap. 2, fol. 19
1571), quoted in CHAFUEN, supra note 20, at 34-35.

(Seville,
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Proposition 5: Markets allow minority preferences to be satisfied.

Modern American environmental activists often have a peculiar gap in
their historical memories. They recall Eden-like conditions that prevailed in
North America before the arrival of European settlers with startling clarity-clarity that is all the more startling because their recollections are often
of conditions that never existed. 36 They often do not recall that earlier generations were just as concerned about the environment as they are today,
albeit with different preferences shaped by both different world views and
different resources. One particularly dramatic class of prior environmental
management decisions that are now generally believed to have been significant mistakes were the predator eradication programs popular in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 37 Eradication of wolves in the west
and eradication of rap tors more generally were steps undertaken by people
concerned with the environment and intent on "improving" it. That we now
believe they were wrong does not alter the fact that these earlier managers
of the environment believed they were behaving as responsible stewards of
the land.
Control of predators, particularly wolves and raptors, was undertaken
with public support and public resources. 38 Bounties were paid, habitat destroyed, and animals and birds slaughtered by the thousands in an effort to
"improve" the environment. Not everyone agreed that eradicating predators
was a good idea, however, and a few individuals were able to use private
funds to lease and purchase crucial habitat to sustain the threatened species.
In Pennsylvania, Rosalie Edge saved vital hawk breeding territories by first
leasing and ultimately purchasing them in private transactions. Using her
market-acquired property rights, she established the Hawk Mountain reserve and not only saved the area's hawks from slaughter but contributed to
changing public opinion about the desirability of raptor eradication.
Had the question of raptor eradication been put to a vote in 1900, it is
likely that a majority of Americans would have endorsed it as an environmentally sensible public policy goal. But because economic markets, unlike
political markets, are not winner-take-all forums, those who dissented from
the majority view were able to satisfy their own preferences by acting in the
marketplace.
When markets are not allowed to function, however, minority preferences are often overridden with environmentally dangerous consequences.
36. See Robert H. Nelson, Environmental Religion: A Theological Critique, 55 CASE W. REs.
L. REV. 51, 69-71 (2004) (discussing attempts to restore forests to "pre-European" conditions).
37. See HANK FISCHER, WOLF WARS 17-23 (1995) (discussing history of wolf eradication
programs); Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights, Pesticides, & Public Health:
Explaining the Paradox of Modern Pesticide Policy, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1, 16-22 (2002)
(discussing pesticide spraying programs).
38. See Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, The Destructive Role of Land Use Planning,
14 TuL. ENVTL. LJ. 95, 128-29 (2000) (detailing the Hawk Mountain story).
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To take but one example, consider the aerial spraying of pesticides to control the gypsy moth on Long Island, New York in the late 1950s and early
1960s.39 Federally funded efforts to eradicate the pest led to blanket spraying of private and public land alike, despite the extremely limited nature of
the infestation. Landowners who objected, including bird enthusiasts and
organic farmers, repeatedly sought relief in the courts to stop the spraying
of their property. Their objections were overridden as the court held: "[t]he
rights of individuals are not limitless. Individuals must yield to the requirements of the public as a whole."40
These specific examples illustrate a general principle: environmental
policies are rarely simple "yes/no" choices. Disagreements over the appropriate approach to an environmental issue regularly appear and the "right"
answer often changes over time as new information appears, new theories
are tested, and new approaches discovered. An important advantage of market-based solutions is that they allow multiple approaches to coexist, both
with respect to finding the best way to an agreed goal and with respect to
satisfying a diverse set of preferences for environmental goods. Unless we
are extremely confident that we know the truth, allowing a diversity of preferences and approaches is likely to be the best approach in the long run. The
historical record suggests that allowing minority preferences like Rosalie
Edge's love of hawks to be satisfied through market transactions produces
environmentally superior outcomes. Unfortunately, sometimes we confuse
our knowledge of eternal Truths such as the divinity of Christ with our
imperfect knowledge of the world in which we live today. Assuming that
our generation has found the depth of knowledge necessary to dictate how
everyone is to behave seems inconsistent with St. Peter's injunction that we
"be clothed with humility."41
Proposition 6: Rent-seeking is pervasive in environmental regulation.

Psalm 146 cautions to "[p]ut not your trust in princes, nor in the son of
man."42 The economic analysis of politics in general and of environmental
regulation in particular, reinforces this lesson. 43 "Economic rents" are payments that go beyond the cost of providing a service.
Most people spend a considerable amount of their lives looking
for rents. We all want to be paid more than enough to get us to
work each day. We are rent-seekers, one and all. Seeking rents in
the political arena can have a higher payoff than seeking rents in
39. See Morriss & Meiners, supra note 37, at 16-22 (discussing Long Island pesticide spraying controversy).
40. Murphy v. Benson, 164 F. Supp. 120, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
41. 1 Peter 5:5 (King James).
42. Psalm 146:3 (King James).
43. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE ill (2003) for a summary of public choice
theory.
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the world of work. The reason is simple: With the stroke of a pen
a politician can cause vast amounts of resources to be transferred
from taxpayers or consumers to the providers of politically favored services. For example, reducing automobile exhaust emissions improves air quality. How is a regulator to do so? By
specifying that all automobiles must have catalytic converters to
reduce emissions brought huge profits to the owner of patents on
key technology, which happened to be General Motors. Air quality improves and GM makes more money. 44
Thus despite lofty language in some environmental statutes setting unrealistic zero discharge goals,45 environmental regulation largely consists of
the distribution and redistribution of valuable rights by regulators. 46 For
example, when regulators restrict construction on some beachfront lots,
they increase the value of neighboring lots where construction is allowed by
limiting the supply of beachfront property.47 Allocations of emissions rights
to particular sources provides the recipients with valuable legal rights and I
have argued elsewhere that car and truck manufacturers are engaged in a
competition with stationary sources for emissions rights in the context of
the Clean Air Act's State Implementation Plans. 48 Because of the value of
these rights, people are willing to invest considerable resources to obtain
them. If the rights are allocated through the marketplace, those investments
will be made by paying the seller for the rights. If the rights are distributed
through the political process, however, the only way to influence their allocation is to influence the political process. Interest groups that can profit
from the allocation of rights will thus seek to influence rights distribution
by influencing legislators and regulators.
Interest groups need not resort to anything as crude as outright bribery
to gain influence. Even the most publicly-minded candidate must accumulate significant funds to gain election or reelection and doing so generally
requires providing interest groups capable of delivering those funds with
something. The result is that interest groups and political considerations
play considerable roles in environmental policy. Examples range from the
classic "Clean Coal/Dirty Air" coalition of environmental groups and eastern coal interests during the debate over the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments that produced statutory provisions that disadvantaged cleaner western
coal relative to more polluting eastern coal49 to the legendary clout of
44. ANDREW P. MORRISS, BRUCE YANDLE & ANDREW DORCHAK, REGULATION BY LITIGATION (forthcoming 2008).
45. 33 U.S.c. § 1251(a)(I) (1977) ("[Ilt is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants
into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.").
46. See Andrew P. Morriss, The Politics of the Clean Air Act, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 263 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 2000).
47. See note 11 and associated text supra discussing the facts of the Lucas case.
48. See Morriss, supra note 46 (discussing this competition).
49. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COALIDIRTY AIR (1981).
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Michigan Rep. John Dingell, whose efforts on behalf of Detroit's auto makers produced the term "Dingell-gram" for the summonses he issued to regulators to appear before his committee to answer for regulations that harmed
Detroit's interests. 50 Good government cannot be presumed to be the result
of entrusting power to fallible men and women, for the human flaws that
afflict private behavior are still present when those same individuals enter
the public sector. As economist Rick Stroup has noted, the general problem
is that good government is itself a public good and is thus underprovided in
the marketplace. 51
These second three propositions make the point that markets are not
incompatible with the environment. That does not mean markets always
produce the environmentally preferred outcome, however defined. It does
mean that a market-based society that allows decentralized decision-making
by holders of private property rights protected by tort, property, and contract law is not inherently problematic for environmental quality. But what
about the poor? How will applying market principles affect them?
WHAT ABOUT THE POOR?

Catholic social thought and Christian social thought generally has produced a great deal of insight into Christians' obligations toward the pOOr. 52
Economists also have a great deal to say about poverty and much of it
consists of pointing out fallacies upon which anti-poverty policies often
rest. For example, many people incorrectly believe that raising the minimum wage will improve the economic position of the poor. 53 A vast
amount of empirical evidence supports this consensus. 54 It should not take a
Ph.D. in economics to understand why raising the minimum wage is likely
to hurt those without jobs by making hiring them more expensive, particu50. Richard J. Leon, Congressional Investigations: Are Partisan Politics Undermining Our
Vital Institutions?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 825, 827 (1997-98), stating:
And when one focuses on congressional oversight, nobody in the modern history of
Congress was more admired, and feared, than ... John Dingell. Congressman Dingell
... conducted oversight investigations of the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Food and Drug Administration, and other agencies, that to this day are legendary. Government employees used to quake in their boots when they received requests for information known as 'Dingellgrams' at their agencies.
51. Richard L. Stroup, Free Riders and Collective Action Revisited, 4 INDEP. REv. 485, 485
(2000) ("The formation and successful control of a government program in the public interest, for
any reasonable definition of that nebulous term, are themselves public goods.").
52. As an Orthodox Christian, I am particularly glad that I share with my Catholic friends the
sermons of St. John Chyrsostom on the parable of Lazarus and the rich man, which predate the
division between the Eastern and Western Churches. See ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, ON WEALTH
AND POVERTY (Catharine P. Roth trans., St. Vladimir's Seminary Press 1984), which is instructive
on the dangers of wealth.
53. See WOODS, supra note 2, at 50-71 (a particularly instructive analysis of wage issues
from a Catholic market perspective).
54. See Donald Deere, Kevin M. Murphy, and Finis Welch, Sense and Nonsense on the
Minimum Wage, 18 REGULATION No.1, at 47 (1995) (reviewing evidence on minimum wage
impacts).
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larly since the advocates of the federal minimum wage explicitly designed it
to make certain types of employment uneconomical. 55 From the frequency
with which raising the minimum wage is proposed as a solution to poverty,
however, it appears that it does take a level of economic sophistication beyond that possessed by the average politician and, by implication, the average voter.
Let me stress that the issue is not the intentions behind efforts to help
the environment that lead to bad outcomes for the poor. The question is
whether such efforts actually help or harm. Bjorn Lomborg closes his book
on global warming, Cool It, by saying
I hope we can look the coming generations squarely in the eyes
and say that we didn't just do what seemed fashionably good; we
massively and thoroughly changed the world for the better
through simple, tested, and cool strategies. We didn't just do
something that made us feel good; we did something that actually
did good. 56
To effectively address the needs of the poor, we must adapt our efforts
to the world, not attempt to force the world to fit within preconceived notions about how the world works. As Thomas Woods argues, quoting Gregory Gronbacher, "[t]here are fundamental market realities that cannot be
ignored for any reason, including moral concerns, because, in so doing,
further harm may result to both market mechanisms and morality." This
critical point can no longer be overlooked. As Etienne Gilson put it, "Piety
is no substitute for technique."57 I will therefore address the question of the
impact of market-based environmental solutions for the poor by offering
three additional propositions that capture key insights of economic analysis
on some of the most important aspects of environmental law.

Proposition 7: People with fewer resources do better in economic
markets than they do in political markets.
The literature on the poor and the environment-which goes loosely
by the name "environmental justice"-tends to focus on the location of pollution sources near poor neighborhoods, the alleged laxness of emissions
standards near poor neighborhoods, and so forth. In addition to assuming
55. See Marc Linder, The Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role, 16 J.
LEGIS. 151, 155-56 (1989-90) ("[T]he appropriate response to the argument that the minimum
wage hurts the very people it is supposed to protect is: the minimum wage helps those marginal
workers by forcing their inefficient employers either to rationalize or to be driven out of business
by more efficient competitors paying higher wages.").
56. LOMBORG, supra note 7, at 164. Lomborg's conscience should be clear on this score. His
"Copenhagen Consensus" project has produced some of the clearest thinking about environmental
priorities, taking into account scarcity and tradeoffs. See Copenhagen Consensus Center, Copenhagen Consensus 2008, http://www.copenhagenconsensus.comlDefault.aspx?ID=788 (last visited
Feb. 6, 2008).
57. WOODS, supra note 2, at 9 (citations omitted).
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that there is a zero, or perhaps even negative, sum game being played over
the location of facilities (which I think is largely false-see my next proposition), these complaints miss an essential point: being poor (defined as
not having resources) means you don't have the things that resources get
you. Among those things that you don't have are nice locations for your
housing. More importantly, it also means that you lack the resources to do
well in both political and economic markets. What I want to argue now is
that the poor do worse in political markets relative to economic markets,
and so shifting decisions from the economic marketplace to the political
marketplace disadvantages the poor relative to the rich.
In economic markets, the poor have few resources but they do have
some resources. Businesses can make money by meeting the needs of the
poor and often do. For example, Wal-Mart saves consumers money, which
benefits the poor disproportionately58 and does so through a strategy that
targets price-conscious consumers. The poor may not get as much as the
rich in the economic marketplace, but they do get something.
In contrast, the political marketplace discriminates heavily against the
poor. It does so in many ways; let us consider just three. First, the political
marketplace often makes winner-take-all decisions, unlike the economic
marketplace which has room for both Wal-Mart and Nordstrom's. If only
one set of preferences is going to be satisfied, it seems unlikely that it
would be the preferences of the group with fewer resources. Second, most
voters are rationally ignorant of the details of political proposals and political candidates' policies. 59 Correctly reasoning that their vote is unlikely to
make a difference in the outcome of an election or a legislature's vote on a
proposed law, voters rarely invest in becoming informed consumers of politicians to the same extent they invest in making a choice between a Ford
and a Chevrolet. As a result, the public choice literature has documented the
tendency of political markets to deliver benefits concentrated on a few at
costs distributed to many. Again, the most likely winners in such a competition are those who can afford "access" to politicians, which comes at considerable cost. Finally, the political marketplace makes decisions in state
capitals and Washington, D.C., locations that are remote from the lives of
most Americans. (The same holds true in other nations, of course). Navigat58. See Jeny Hausman & Ephraim Leibtag, Consumer Benefits from Increased Competition
in Shopping Outlets: Measuring the Effect of Wal-Mart, MIT and Economic Research Service,
U.S. Dept. of Ag. Revised Draft (Oct. 2005), available at http://econ-www.mit.edulfilesI1765.
59. See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARv.
L. REv. 511, n.63 (2000-01), stating:
Rational ignorance describes the systematic tendency of citizens to pay little attention to
political infonnation. The phenomenon occurs because acquiring infonnation about
politics is both costly and unproductive. It is costly because, to acquire such infonnation, individuals must invest time that they could be using in other more lucrative or
pleasurable enterprises. It is unproductive because, although the principal instrumental
use of such infonnation is to guide voting, the vote of anyone individual is unlikely to
influence the outcome of an election.
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ing the corridors of power or deciphering the pages of the latest proposal in
the Federal Register requires specialized expertise from lawyers and lobbyists, neither of which are readily accessible to the poor. Shifting decisions
from the economic marketplace to the political marketplace disadvantages
the poor. 60 Unfortunately, that is what many environmental laws and regulations do.
Moreover, governments have the means (coercion) to solve free rider
problems. But their efficiency stems from being good at coercion, which
overcomes free riding at relatively low cost. But that coercive power is
dangerous precisely because it is so efficient. It tempts people to use it for
their own benefit. Institutions that protect us from special interests' ability
to divert the power of the state to their own benefit also reduce our ability to
accomplish through the state laudable goals as well. For example, bicameralism is a fundamental part of the American system of government and
guarantor of individual liberty, yet its method of protecting liberty is to
deliberately make government inefficient. 61
Nobel laureate James Buchanan, who won the prize for his innovations
in public choice theory, debated the equally eminent public finance economist Richard Musgrave in a series of lectures in 1998. In the course of their
debate, Buchanan summarized the difference between his point of view,
which focuses on the dangers of unconstrained power, and Musgrave's,
which focused on the potential provision of worthwhile public goods
through a government solution of the free rider problem. Buchanan put it
this way:
I raised this question: Don't you feel that under certain circumstances, you would want to constrain the government? And I said,
for example, suppose you had a tiger, a pet tiger. Wouldn't you
want to have a muzzle on that pet tiger in case he might bite
somebody? So you put him on a muzzle. And Richard Musgrave
said, oh I wouldn't want to do that because I might want the tiger
to eat the grass. 62
If government is a tiger, and the great weight of the evidence suggests
that governments' claws and teeth are sharp, then Buchanan's prescription
of a muzzle is a vital caution. And the first to be bitten, after all, are hardly
likely to be the rich and powerful, so this is a matter of concern for the
60. As Professor Hill noted to me in commenting on an earlier draft of this article, shifting
decisions from the marketplace to politics is not only unlikely to help the poor given their relative
disadvantages in the latter, but is likely to shift the balance of power even more in favor of the
well-connected because the re-ordering of economic affairs sufficiently to change economic inequality requires a substantial increase in political power.
61. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) ("In purely practical terms, it is
obviously easier for action to be taken by one House without submission to the President; but it is
crystal clear ... that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency.").
62. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
Two CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE 88-89 (1999).
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poor. For example, a recent study by the Institute for Justice found that
eminent domain powers exercised in pursuit of "economic development"
are most often used against the poor,63 evidence that the powers of the state
are at best a two-edged sword for those concerned with the welfare of the
powerless.
Proposition 8: Trade creates wealth.

The fundamental problem with being poor is that you are poor-that
is, by definition, you lack resources. Not having resources is bad, at least in
this life. 64 Market economies excel at creating economic growth, which
makes everyone, including the poor better off.65 The best way for people to
stop being poor, therefore, is for them to live in a society in which economic freedom allows individuals to trade with one another without interference. This brings us to one of the most important contributions of
economic theory: comparative advantage, which is the basis of trade. As
Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson noted, comparative advantage is a proposition that is both true and nontrivial. Its truth can be established by mathematical deduction as well as through empirical studies. That it is non-trivial
is "attested by the thousands of important and intelligent men who have
never been able to grasp the doctrine for themselves or to believe it after it
was explained to them. "66
The implications of this for environmental law and policy is that it
becomes important independently of the implications for environmental
quality that environmental protection laws and regulations interfere to the
smallest extent possible, consistent with achieving their goals, with the
overall functioning of the economy. For example, suppose we can reach an
air pollution goal either by mandating across-the-board reductions for all
sources or through a tradable permit system that allows sources to reduce
emissions beyond the across-the-board level and sell credits to other
sources, who would then be relieved of the requirement to reduce to the
across-the-board level. The former method costs more to implement than
the latter method because it does not take into account differences in the
63. See DICK M. CARPENIER II & JOHN K. Ross, rnsT. OF JUSTICE, VICTIMIZING THE VULNERABLE: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE 6 (2007) ("Losses from eminent domain abuse 'fall disproportionately on the poor,' and particularly on minorities.").
64. One response suggested by a commentator on an earlier draft is that there are plenty of
people who think the poor are better off being poor and so it was necessary to specify a theory
about what we want for the poor. I am assuming that the goal of concern for the poor is the
alleviation of poverty. We may not succeed, but our obligation, like that of the rich man in the
parable of Lazarus and the Rich Man from Luke's Gospel, is to do our best to succeed.
65. GREGORY CLARK, A FAREWELL TO ALMS 3 (2007) ("There have been benefits [from
economic growth following the Industrial Revolution] aplenty for the typically wealthy owners of
land or capital, and for the educated. But industrialized economies saved their best gifts for the
poorest.").
66. PAUL ANTHONY SAMUELSON, THE COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAMUELSON 683 (1972).
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cost of reduction amongst sources. Environmentally the two methods of
pollution control may produce identical outcomes, but the across-the-board
method will reduce economic activity more than the latter. The cost of this
foregone economic activity is likely to be disproportionately borne by the
poor.
A classic example of how environmental policies that do not take market principles into account harm the poor is the impact of U.S. policies
promoting ethanol on Mexico's poor. In large part because of the environmentally-driven67 subsidies for corn-based ethanol production in the United
States, corn prices have risen dramatically, producing a quadrupling of tortilla prices in Mexico. 68 These same policies also produce environmental
problems, by leading to more intensive farming techniques and expansion
of mono-crop agriculture. 69
It is also crucial to consider that trade creates wealth; it does not redistribute it.7° When people engage in voluntary trade, there is more wealth
after the trade than before it. (If there wasn't, people would not engage in
the trade.) Since poverty is defined by the absence of wealth, the. creation of
wealth is fundamental to reducing poverty. Not only are the poor more
likely to bear the brunt of any restrictions on trade relative to other groups,
the absolute impact on the poor is also likely to be larger than on any other
group.
Moreover, thinking about trade raises the critical question of to which
poor we are to give a preferential option. The average caloric consumption
in the industrialized countries is almost twice that in the poorest region of
Africa.71 Environmental policy debates that fail to address improving lifestyles for the poor in developed economies cannot be said to be considering
seriously the preferential option for the poor.
67. Special interest politics are a key reason for ethanol subsidies, but I am assuming that the
ethanol program has an environmental goal here which makes the argument I am advancing
stronger. See Jonathan H. Adler, Rent Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, 19 REGULATION No.4,
at 26 (1996), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg19n4b.html (describing rent
seeking in 1990s ethanol programs).
68. Manuel Roig-Franzia, A Culinmy and Cultural Staple in Crisis, WASH. POST, Jan. 27,
2007, at AI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentlartic1e/2007 /01126/AR
2007012601896_pf.html.
69. See David Pimentel, Ethanol Fuels: Energy Balance, Economics, and Environmental Impacts are Negative, 12 NAT. RESOURCES REs., June 2003, at 127.
70. This is true of the rise of market economies generally. As economic historian Gregory
Clark writes,
[G]rowth in capitalist economies since the Industrial Revolution strongly promoted
greater equality. Despite fears that machines would swallow up men, the greatest beneficiaries of the Industrial Revolution so far have been unskilled workers.
CLARK, supra note 65, at 11.
71. Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., Statistics Division, Food Security Statistics (2007), http://www.fao.org/es/ess/faostatlfoodsecurity/index_en.htm.
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Proposition 9: Wealth increases the demand for environmental goods and
services as well as reducing poverty.

Curing poverty implies making poor people wealthier. But wealth not
only makes a person less poor, it also changes a person's preferences. At
the most basic level, people demand many environmental goods and services after they have satisfied more basic needs for food and shelter. There
is evidence of an environmental Kuznets curve with respect to at least some
environmental quality issues, where demand increases once income per capita has exceeded about $5,000 per year.72 Caring for the poor by helping to
make them less poor is thus likely to have beneficial consequences for the
environment. Addressing poverty is good for the environment as well as for
the poor.
But wait-won't all those newly middle class people want cars, big
screen TVs, and other consumer goods? Won't they want to move into
larger, suburban homes? If we let the poor out of their inner-city ghettos,
won't they want to be like the rest of us? And if they do become like us,
won't they adopt lots of terrible middle class habits, like consuming more
energy, more stuff, and more space? As Italian journalist Carla Ravaioli
asked many of the world's leading economists in her book Economists and
the Environment: what do we do when the Chinese all want cars?73
It seems likely that the poor will want many of the things richer folks
now have once they are no longer poor. They will want bigger houses with
more energy-using appliances; they'll want new cars, and some may even
want SUVs. They will buy more things, throwaway the packaging, and
only occasionally recycle. Is this bad news for the environment?
There are three possible responses to this question. The first is implicit
in many environmental pressure groups' critiques of American society:
Yes, it is an environmental disaster if poor people start acting like middle
class Americans, particularly poor people in other countries. As a result, we
need to find a way to keep the poor from developing our bad habits. Since
this essentially means that the poor have to stay poor until some miraculous
technological innovation appears to allow them to improve their living standards without causing any adverse environmental impact, I think anyone
who takes seriously a preferential option for the poor must reject it outright.
(Alternatively, some authoritarian solution might be adopted to reduce people's living standards who aren't currently poor to provide both an increased quality of life for the poor and an increased environmental quality.)
72. See BRUCE YANDLE, MADHUSUDAN BHA'ITARAI & MAYA VIJAYARAGHAVAN, PROP. &
ENVTL. RESEARCH CENTER, ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE: A REvmw OF FINDINGS, METHODS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2004),

73.

available at

http://www.perc.org/pdf/rs02_1a.pdf.

CARLA RAVAIOLI WITH A CONTRIBUTION BY PAUL EKINS, ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Richard Bates trans., Zed Books 1995) (1984).
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The second is to agree that the environmental impact of reducing poverty is likely to be negative but to accept it as inevitable. This is unacceptable as well. 1.322 billion Chinese driving the equivalent of Hummers (or,
perhaps worse, Toyota Priuses?4 would have a major environmental impact
that likely would have a number of unacceptable consequences for the Chinese as well as the rest of the world.
The third response is the only one that is both likely and the only one
that is morally acceptable. Among those 1.322 billion Chinese drivers are a
vast number of poets, artists, musicians, engineers, scientists, lawyers, doctors, and people of every other human profession. Some one or more of
those Hummer-driving new consumers may well be the person who finds a
solution to some of these problems. As economist Julian Simon said, humanity is the "ultimate resource,"75 and it is in humanity that we will find
solutions to problems that seem unimaginably complex and unsolvable today. Man is a creative being, in no small part because we are made in the
image of the One who created us. And we are to use our creativity: in the
Parable of the Talents, it was the servants who received five and two talents
and who invested them and earned returns for their lord who were bid to
"enter into the joy of your lord" while the servant who received only one
talent and who did nothing but hid the money to keep it safe was "cast into
outer darkness."76
CONCLUSION

It is beyond doubt that economics provides a useful description of important properties of the world in which we live (propositions 1-3), that its
principles provide a useful guide to improving the environment (propositions 4-6), and that by understanding and heeding those principles we can
harmonize our concern for the poor with our concern for the natural world
(propositions 7-9). Together those support my bolder claim: that economics
is a necessary, but not sufficient, component of moral analysis of environmental problems.

Proposition 10: Economic analysis provides moral clarity that enables us
to provide a preferential option for the poor.
To make this case, let us consider three environmental dilemmas that
implicate the demands of Christianity that we give a preferential option to
74. See CNW MARKETING RESEARCH, DUST TO DUST: THE ENERGY COST OF NEW VEHICLES
FROM CONCEPT TO DISPOSAL (2005), available at http://cnwmr.com/nss-folder/automotiveenergy/
DUST%20PDF%20VERSION.pdf (finding that environmental impact of Prius greater than that of
Hummer).
75. See JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE (1981) and THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE II
(1996).
76. Matthew 14:31 (King James).
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the poor and ask what economics can contribute to the moral understanding
of each.

Dilemma 1: Air pollution: reductions on the margin.
A major air pollution control initiative in the United States is EPA's
proposed revision of the federal air quality standard for ozone. According to
EPA's Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), reducing the acceptable level of
ozone to 0.075 ppm from 0.084 ppm would cost between $5.5 and $8.8
billion and yield net benefits of $7.3 to $16 billion, depending on the assumptions and methods used to estimate the costs and benefits.77 Although
there are many questions about the validity of much of the science underlying the proposal,78 let us accept these calculations as a reasonable estimate
of the standard's costs and benefits.
Air pollution in developing countries is also a problem. The major air
pollution problem in much of the world stems from the use of solid fuels
indoors (in particular, the use of wood, dung, and crop residues) for heat
and cooking. 79 The World Health Organization concluded that
Globally, reliance on solid fuels has emerged as one of the ten
most important threats to public health. In 2000, indoor air pollution was responsible for more than 1.5 million deaths and 2.7% of
the global burden of disease. In high-mortality developing countries, it accounted for 3.7% of the burden of disease, making it the
most important risk factor after malnutrition, the HIV/AIDS epidemic and lack of safe water and adequate sanitation. Indoor air
pollution disproportionately affects women and children who
spend the most time near the domestic hearth.80
Economic analysis provides a framework for comparing the impact of
spending on reducing the level of ozone in the United States and on addressing indoor air pollution issues in developing countries. It is not an
answer to this dilemma to say that we must do both, for resources spent on
one are unavailable to the other. Given the resources we have, where should
we spend those resources? An economic analysis puts the choice in stark
terms, forcing us to confront the reality that a choice to focus our resources
on the relatively small marginal improvements a more stringent ozone stan77. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, EXECUTNE SUMMARY, TBL. ES.2 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttniecas/regdata/RIAs/ozoneriaexecsum.pdf.
78. See, e.g., Joel Schwartz, How Environmentalists and Scientists Mislead Americans About
Air Pollution and Climate Change, Planet Gore on National Review Online (Sept. 14, 2007)
(critiquing the Natural Resources Defense Council's report, HEAT ADVISORY: How GLOBAL
WARMING CAUSES MORE BAD AIR DAYS (2007)), available at http://planetgore.nationalreview.
com!posti?q=ZDNiNDIyODIONTdiMjRlY2UyMTYxMmRiY2YyMzk4ZWY=.
79. WHO, INDOOR AIR POLLUTION: NATIONAL BURDEN OF DISEASE ESTIMATES 1 (2007),
available at http://www. who.intiindCiorair/publications/indoocaicnationaCburden_estimate_revised.pdf.
80. [d.
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dard could bring can only be justified if we value the time and lives of
Americans significantly more highly than we value the time and lives of the
poor whose lives could be dramatically improved by addressing indoor air
pollution. A full analysis of the details of the calculations necessary to make
such an assessment is well beyond the scope of this paper, but even backof-the-envelope calculations suggest that there is such an overwhelmingly
larger marginal benefit possible from addressing indoor air pollution in the
developing world than addressing ozone standards in the United States that
the choice is likely to be obvious.
Dilemma 2: Trade in endangered species.

Both the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) prohibit virtually all trade in
endangered species and products made from endangered species. In particular, there is a ban on trade in ivory products that is intended to help preserve
African elephants. Philosopher David Schmidtz examined the incentives
created by the ban and concluded that the result was to increase killing of
elephants, as it turned elephants from a resource worth preserving into one
with only negative economic impacts. 81
But, as Schmidtz notes, preserving elephants also entailed killing
some. Herds had to be culled to keep them within manageable sizes given
the food supplies in nature preserves. Making the elephants the property of
the neighboring villages gave the elephants' neighbors a reason to tolerate
the destruction the elephants cause and helped the poor by providing them
with a new economic resource. But giving the elephants to the villagers also
meant the villagers would sell the right to hunt some of the elephants.
There are powerful reasons to find a preservation policy built around
killing elephants unacceptable, including the fact that elephants are sufficiently self-aware to have some understanding of the death of their fellows.
As Schmidtz summarizes, elephants
are not the kind of creature that we have a right to treat as mere
means. Cynthia Moss [director of the Amboseli Elephant Research Project] ... said she would rather see elephants go extinct
than see individual animals murdered for sake of population control, and she is not alone. If elephants had a voice in the matter,
perhaps they would thank Moss for her stand. Perhaps not. 82
Yet the problem is that preservationism alone will not preserve. As
Schrnidtz concludes
81. David Schmidtz, When Preservation ism Doesn't Preserve, 6 ENVTL. VALUES 327 (1997),
reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: WHAT REALLY MATTERS, WHAT REALLY WORKS 320
(David Schmidtz & Elizabeth Willott eds., 2002) (discussing elephant preservation dilemmas).
82. [d. at 327.

208

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:1

I have come to realize that preservationism often and predictably
does not work in the context of a social arrangement in which the
cost of upholding preservationist ideals has to be born by people
who do not embrace those ideals. Even given that preservationism
is acceptable as a personal ideal, it remains a bad idea to create
institutions that depend upon people who do not share that ideal
to take responsibility for realizing it. 83
Preservationism does not preserve because it fails to take into account
some of the basic economic propositions discussed in this article. Failing to
do so means elephant preservation efforts will not succeed. It also means
that the large numbers of poor people who live near elephants will suffer.
As Schmidtz notes, elephants are pests when they are your neighborsthey trample crops and fences. Unless people can profit from the elephants,
they have no reason to choose to tolerate the wildlife's depredations. 84 Taking care of the poor, by making them able to profit from the elephants, also
became a way of taking care of the elephants, since it helped to ensure their
survival as a species. Economic analysis provides a clear view of the institutions and their incentives necessary to this crucial insight. The choices are
not easy, but without an economic framework they cannot be understood.
Dilemma 3: DDT and malaria.
The virtually world-wide ban of DDT was one of the most important early
symbolic victories of the new environmental pressure groups that emerged
in the 1960s and early 1970s. 85 Spurred by Rachel Carson's Silent Spring,
environmentalists rallied against the pesticide and largely forced it from the
scene. But DDT turns out to be remarkably effective in controlling malaria-a pestilence that kills the equivalent of the number of passengers in
seven 747s per day86-and its low cost makes it particularly well-suited for
poorer, developing countries still plagued by the disease. 87
An economic analysis of the question of DDT use forces people to
confront the tradeoffs between the environmental impact of DDT use and
the cost in human lives and misery caused by foregoing its use. This is not
an easy calculation to make, nor is the long delay by the developed world in
responding to the growing crisis of malaria in many developing countries
83. Id. at 328.
84. Id. at 322 ("Whether we like it or not, the elephants will not survive except by sharing the
land with people, which means their long-term survival depends on whether the people of Africa
can afford to share.").
85. See Morriss & Meiners, supra note 38, at 23-27 (describing battles over DDT registration in the U.S.).
86. Afshin Mo1avi, Africa'S Malaria Death Toll Still 'Outrageously High', NAT'L GEOGRAPmc NEWS, June 12, 2003, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.comlnews/2003/06/
0612_030612_ma1aria.html.
87. David Brown, WHO Urges Use oj DDT in Africa, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2006, at A9,
available at http://www.wasmngtonpost.comlwp-dynlcontentlartic1e/2006/09115/AR200609150 1
012.html.
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easy to forgive. Confronting such difficult choices is what we must do, if
we are to come to terms with our responsibilities to the poor.

***
Economics is often called the dismal science. And its predictions can
be dismal indeed for those who do not heed its counsel. But once we confront the world through the lens of economic thinking-as Terry Anderson
of PERC said, through "Coase-colored glasses"88-the dismal label seems
inappropriate. Instead let us rejoice that God designed the world such that
we do not depend on the goodness of our fellow men for our daily bread.
Given the fallen nature of the world, I think it no accident that it is not, as
Adam Smith famously observed "from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to
their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their
self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages."89 If He had left us dependent on the good will of our neighbors for
our suppers, humanity's history would have been marked by a great deal of
hunger. God did not put us into an abundant world to starve.
In addressing the needs of the poor and the demands of stewardship,
good intentions are not enough; we must do what actually works. Markets
work. The alternatives do not. That markets are a second best alternative
necessitated by the fallen nature of our world is irrelevant if second best is
all we can attain. We have lived in the epoch of legislation based on good
intentions since the progressive era. Perhaps it is time we return to a world
in which we recognize the limits of human-designed institutions such as
governments and address our serious problems through institutions that utilize the insights of economic analysis and harness our innate self-interest in
order to improve the lives of the poor while protecting that with which we
have been entrusted. If we do so, I believe we will find that our obligations
to be good stewards of God's creation and to care for our less fortunate
brethren are more readily and effectively addressed.

88. See generally Terry L. Anderson, Donning Coase-Coloured Glasses: A Property Rights
View of Natural Resource Economics, 48 AUSTRL. J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 445 (2004).
89. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS I
26-27 (Liberty Fund 1981) (1776).

